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Abstract
This article contributes to the literature on the models of immigrants’ labour market incorporation in Western Europe
by analysing the employment returns to tertiary education for both natives and immigrants. By using yearly EU-LFS data
(2005–2013) for a selection of Western European countries, cross-country differences in the employment returns to ter-
tiary education are analysed separately by immigrant status and gender. In Continental Europe, where immigrant-native
employment gaps before the crisis were much larger than in Southern Europe, immigrants are found to benefit more
from tertiary education, and their returns are also higher than for natives, while the opposite holds in Southern European
countries. The same pattern is found irrespective of gender, but cross-country differences are more pronounced among
women. The article also documents that the crisis contributed to a cross-country convergence, although limited to men,
in the degree of immigrant employment disadvantage, which increased substantially in Southern Europe while remaining
unchanged or slightly declining in all other countries. Nevertheless, although immigrant-native employment gaps grew as
high as in Continental Europe, immigrant men in Southern Europe are still found to benefit from lower returns to tertiary
education than their native counterparts.
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1. Introduction
The existence of substantial heterogeneity in immigrants’
labour market outcomes acrossWestern European coun-
tries is well known.More precisely, the literature has out-
lined the existence of twomainmodels of immigrants’ in-
corporation (Reyneri & Fullin, 2011a, 2011b). In Central
and Northern European countries (referred to as Conti-
nental countries henceforth), immigrants face a strong
disadvantage compared to their native counterparts in
employment probability but are less harshly penalised
in terms of job quality. On the other hand, in South-
ern European countries, immigrants are significantly less
harshly penalised in terms of employment opportunities,
but they most often hold low-skilled jobs and face high
risks of remaining entrapped in the secondary segment
of the labour market (Fellini & Guetto, 2018).
However, the recent economic crisis has reshaped,
to some extent, the cross-country pattern of immigrants’
penalisation that was outlined above. In Southern Euro-
pean countries, the crisis has been harsher than in other
European areas, and its more adverse effects have been
on workers who are more weakly attached to the labour
market, i.e., those employed in low-skilled occupations
and in cyclical industries such as construction and manu-
facturing (OECD, 2009). Since male immigrants in South-
ern European countries are largely overrepresented in
those occupations, their employment chances sharply
deteriorated (Fellini, 2017). This contributed to a conver-
gence in immigrant-native employment gaps between
Social Inclusion, 2018, Volume 6, Issue 3, Pages 64–77 64
the Southern and Continental models, at least among
men. The convergence has been limited, however, be-
cause immigrants, conditional on remaining employed,
have not become more likely to hold high-skilled jobs in
Southern Europe (Panichella, 2017)
This article contributes to the literature on the dif-
ferent models of immigrants’ labour market incorpora-
tion in Western Europe by looking at the cross-country
pattern of the employment returns to education. Immi-
grants are usually found to benefit from lower returns
to education compared to natives, both in terms of job
quality and wages (Chiswick, 1978; Chiswick & Miller,
2009; Friedberg, 2000; Kanas & Van Tubergen, 2009).
However, while the limited transferability of the human
capital (Chiswick, 1978; Chiswick & Miller, 2009) and ed-
ucational credentials (Lancee & Bol, 2017) acquired in
the country of origin may limit access to highly-skilled
jobs, the consequences on the employment returns to
education are less straightforward and debated. More-
over, the different models of immigrants’ labour mar-
ket incorporation are expected to moderate the extent
to which the returns to education differ between immi-
grants and natives.
By using data from the European Union Labour Force
Survey from2005–2013 (Eurostat, 2013), the article tests
whether, how and to what extent the association be-
tween the attainment of a tertiary degree and employ-
ment status varies by immigrant status and gender in a
selection of Western European countries. Based on hu-
man capital and credential theories, the employment
returns to education should be lower for immigrants
compared to natives. However, tertiary education is ex-
pected to yield higher returns for immigrants in Continen-
tal countries, i.e., where they face greater difficulties in
finding a job. In fact, the high demand for highly-skilled
jobs in these countries should make the possession of
higher education more valuable (Brodmann & Polavieja,
2011; Kogan, 2006). On the contrary, in Southern Europe,
where immigrants have easier access to low-skilled jobs,
the employment returns should be lower. In the second
step, the way in which employment returns to education
have been affected by the crisis is explored, focusing on
men only. This article analyses whether the convergence
of the Continental and Southern European models of
male immigrants’ labour market incorporation that has
been found in the literature (Panichella, 2017) also con-
cerns employment returns to education. Since male im-
migrants are generallymore affected than natives by neg-
ative economic conjunctures (Guzi, Kahanec, & Kureková,
2015b), the salience of higher education for their labour
market attachment is expected to increase in the years
following the onset of the crisis. This may hold especially
true in Southern Europe, where employment returns for
immigrants are expected to be particularly low before
the crisis and the latter has hit more severely.
2. Theoretical Background
2.1. Models of Immigrants’ Labour Market
Incorporation in Western Europe
Several institutional and labour market characteristics of
Western European countries have been posited as influ-
encing the extent to which immigrants are more likely
than natives to be not employed or hold a low-skilled
job. Starting from institutional settings and focusing on
employment probability, a significant emphasis has been
placed on the type and degree of labour market regula-
tions in considering the Employment Protection Legisla-
tion (EPL), the weight of unions and the level of unem-
ployment benefits. Overall, several studies suggest that a
less regulated labour market—i.e., one characterised by
lower union density and coverage, looser EPL and less
generous unemployment benefits—should reduce the
degree of immigrant disadvantage (Causa & Jean, 2007;
Guzi et al., 2015a, 2015b; Huber, 2015; Kogan, 2006,
2007; Markaki, 2014).
The role of the EPL has been highly debated in the lit-
erature, however, because theoretical expectations con-
cerning its effects are not straightforward (Reyneri &
Fullin, 2011a; Sá, 2011). The prevailing argument is that
immigrantswould benefit from looser EPL because lower
firing costs would reduce employers’ perceived risks as-
sociated with hiring immigrant workers who might be
“less productive” (Kogan, 2006, 2007). Several studies
support this view, although some authors found the
strictness of the EPL for permanent and temporary con-
tracts to have opposite effects on immigrants’ employ-
ment chances (Markaki, 2014; Sá, 2011). As far as the
role of unions, since natives are usually over-represented
among their members in all Western societies (Visser,
2015), a high rate of union density is expected to in-
crease immigrant disadvantage. The available empirical
evidence supports the thesis that the higher the union
density is, the worse the immigrants’ labour market out-
comes are compared to those of natives (Guzi et al.,
2015a; Huber, 2015; Markaki, 2014). In fact, the institu-
tional feature of receiving countries that, at least from a
theoretical point of view, has been almost unanimously
associated with higher ethnic penalties is the generos-
ity of welfare benefits for the unemployed. Empirical
evidence suggests that since immigrants tend to have
lower reservation wages than natives, high unemploy-
ment benefits may be conducive to a “welfare trap”,
which might increase the immigrant disadvantage in em-
ployment opportunities (Causa & Jean, 2007; Guzi et al.,
2015b; Reyneri & Fullin, 2011a), especially among more
vulnerable groups such as refugees and asylum seekers
(Hansen & Lofstrom, 2009).
Shifting to more structural features of receiving soci-
eties, the characteristics of labour demand have received
significant attention in the literature. Due to the limited
transferability of the human capital (Chiswick, 1978) and
educational credentials (Lancee & Bol, 2017) acquired
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abroad, immigrants—especially those newly arrived in
the destination country—are generally found to bemore
likely than comparable natives to hold low-skilled occu-
pations in all Western countries (Heath & Cheung, 2007).
Therefore, it is not surprising that countries with a higher
and unsatisfied demand for low-skilled jobs may offer
greater employment opportunities for immigrants (Ko-
gan, 2006, 2007; Reyneri & Fullin, 2011a, 2011b).
By jointly considering the degree of labour market
regulations and the demand for low-skilled jobs, West-
ern European countries can be positioned in a two-
dimensional space as shown in Figure 1. Even if Con-
tinental European countries constitute a rather hetero-
geneous group, they tend to occupy the top-left quad-
rant of Figure 1, which predicts wide immigrant-native
employment gaps. Scandinavian countries represent the
most emblematic case because they share a so-called
“flexicurity” model of labour market regulation (Madsen,
2006) characterised by moderate levels of EPL, very gen-
erous unemployment benefits and high levels of union
density (Visser, 2015), together with a relatively high
level of qualification of labour demand (Brodmann &
Polavieja, 2011).
Southern European countries share an almost oppo-
site labour market configuration. In these countries, wel-
fare benefits are the least generous in Western Europe
(OECD, 2017), and union density levels are lower than
the European average (Visser, 2015). Although South-
ern European labour markets have long been considered
the most “rigid” among OECD countries (Nickell, 1997;
Siebert, 1997), since the first inflows of the 1980s and
1990s, immigrants have oftenworked either in the under-
ground economy or in small firms. Thus, immigrants in
Southern European countries have always been included
in a specific segment of the labour market where reg-
ulation is de facto very low (Reyneri, 1998, 2004). The
lack of public services for the care of children and el-
derly people has generated a demand for (cheap) house-
hold and personal services specifically targeting immi-
grant women (Sciortino, 2004). Furthermore, the preva-
lence of small firms operating in low human capital inten-
sity sectors has contributed to a high demand formanual
workers, usually immigrant men, who are willing to ac-
cept more demanding and less protected working con-
ditions (Reyneri & Fullin, 2011b). Thus, immigrants in
Southern Europe are much more likely than natives to
be employed in the secondary segment of the labour
market characterised by a particularly low degree of
unionisation and overall low levels of social protection
(Fellini, Ferro, & Fullin, 2007; Reyneri & Fullin, 2011b).
The high demand for low-skilled jobs combined with the
de facto low degree of labour market regulations should
produce low levels of immigrant employment disadvan-
tage, as predicted by the bottom-right quadrant of Fig-
ure 1. However, the same features of the model of im-
migrants’ labour market incorporation that contributed
to their lower disadvantage up to the onset of the Great
Recessionmay be related to worsening immigrant unem-
ployment risks relative to those of natives since then. In
fact, the crisis has been particularly harsh in Southern
European countries, especially in cyclical industries such
as construction and manufacturing (OECD, 2009), where
most immigrant men work. Thus, the economic crisis
may have increased immigrant-native gaps in Southern
Europe to levels closer to those found in Continental Eu-
rope, at least among men.
Labour market regulaons
(high)
Labour market regulaons
(low)
MEDIUM PENALTY
Anglo-Saxon Europe
Emblemac case:
UK
SMALL PENALTY
(BEFORE CRISIS)
Southern Europe
Emblemac cases:
Spain, Italy
HIGH PENALTY
Connental Europe
Emblemac case:
Scandinavia
MEDIUM PENALTY
—
Low-skilled jobs
demand
(low)
Low-skilled jobs
demand
(high)
Figure 1. A typology of immigrant employment disadvantage in Western Europe.
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The UK should occupy an intermediate position be-
tween the first two groups of countries. On the one
hand, UK is well-known as the most unregulated labour
market in Western Europe, which should foster better
immigrants’ employment outcomes. Notwithstanding a
labour demand biased towards highly-skilled occupa-
tions, which justifies the positioning in the bottom-left
quadrant of Figure 1, the immigrant employment disad-
vantage could be limited by the strictly selective immi-
gration policy that favours the entry of highly-educated
workers, especially in the health sector (Hardill & Mac-
donald, 2000).
As mentioned in the introduction, the limited avail-
able empirical evidence is consistent with the predic-
tions of Figure 1 (Fellini, 2017; Panichella, 2017). That
is, in Continental Europe immigrant-native employment
gaps were higher than in Southern Europe and the UK
before the crisis, but with the onset of the crisis immi-
grant disadvantage increased substantially in Southern
Europe. While additional empirical evidence for a selec-
tion of Western European destination countries will be
provided in the empirical section, in the following section
how the differentmodels of labourmarket incorporation
shape immigrants’ employment returns to educationwill
be discussed.
2.2. What Are the Employment Returns to Tertiary
Education for Immigrants across Western European
Countries and Economic Conjunctures?
The bulk of evidence shows that immigrants enjoy lower
returns to education compared to natives when access
tomore skilled occupations and higher wages are consid-
ered. However, regarding employment probability, the
predictions are more blurred. In what follows, the em-
ployment returns to education for immigrants, relative
to those for natives, and their differences across coun-
tries are deemed to depend not only on the transfer-
ability of human capital and educational credentials, but
also on the above-mentioned characteristics of the re-
ceiving labour markets which influence the degree of
immigrant employment disadvantage. Thus, while immi-
grants should experience lower employment returns to
education compared to natives, due to the limited trans-
ferability of human capital and educational credentials
acquired in the origin country, a high immigrant-native
employment gap shouldmake immigrants’ possession of
higher education more relevant.
In fact, when selecting individuals aged 25 to 54
who are likely to have finished their schooling and are
far from retirement age, employment rates among na-
tive men tend to be similar and are very high across all
Western European countries. In the selection of coun-
tries considered in this article and in the period before
the crisis (2005–2007), the employment rates of native
men ranged from approximately 87% (Italy) to approxi-
mately 93% (Netherlands), which leaves limited “room”
for large employment returns to education. On the other
hand, employment rates among immigrant men were
significantly lower before the crisis in Continental Eu-
rope, which could make higher education more relevant
for their employment probability, notwithstanding the
lower transferability of the human capital and educa-
tional credentials. This should not occur in Southern Eu-
rope, where immigrants’ employment rates, fostered by
the high demand for low-skilled jobs, were as high as
those of natives before the crisis (Panichella, 2017). Thus,
it can be hypothesised that in Southern European coun-
tries before the crisis, the employment returns to tertiary
education were higher among native men compared to
their immigrant counterparts, due to the limited transfer-
ability of immigrants’ skills and credentials.
The Western European pattern of immigrant disad-
vantage changed dramatically after the onset of the crisis.
The increasing difficulties for male immigrants in remain-
ing employed in Southern European countries may have
increased the relevance of education so that their em-
ployment returns to tertiary education, as well as their
differences with natives, may have become more similar
to those observed among male immigrants in Continen-
tal Europe. However, such a reversal of the gap between
immigrants and natives in the employment returns to ter-
tiary education cannot be taken for granted. In fact, al-
though to a more limited extent, employment rates de-
creased substantially also among native men in South-
ern Europe. For instance, in Spain their employment rate
shifted from approximately 87% in the pre-crisis period
to approximately 74% in the 2011–2013 period. Thus, in-
creasing employment returns to tertiary education can
also be expected from native men in Southern Europe,
likely offsetting the concurrent increase among immi-
grants. In fact, mostmale immigrants in Southern Europe
generally work in manual occupations that are highly
sensitive to the economic cycle, regardless of their ed-
ucational attainment and other personal characteristics
(Fellini & Guetto, 2018). This may have significantly re-
duced the “protective” function of education. Overall,
because of the crisis, male immigrants in Southern Eu-
rope may experience a “double penalty” in that their
increasing disadvantage in employment probability may
go hand in hand with persistently lower employment re-
turns to tertiary education.
When shifting to women, similar results can be ex-
pected when comparing cross-country differences in the
employment returns to tertiary education for natives
and immigrants. As shown in Panichella (2017), the dif-
ferences in immigrant disadvantage between Continen-
tal (and UK) and Southern European countries are larger
than among men and those less affected by the crisis.
Thus, for immigrant women, even more than for men,
the employment returns to tertiary education should be
higher in Continental Europe. Regarding the differences
between immigrant and native women in the returns,
the latter should be positive in Continental and nega-
tive in Southern Europe, similarly to the hypothesised fig-
ures for men. In fact, the differences between the two
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European areas should be even wider. First, it is well-
known that education is much more important for the
labour market participation of women (Steiber & Haas,
2012), and this may be especially true for immigrant
women in Continental Europe, since many of them origi-
nate fromcountrieswhere female employment is not cul-
turally and institutionally promoted, as it will be further
discussed. For the same reason, since native women’s
employment rates are much higher in Continental Eu-
rope (and especially in Scandinavia, where they are close
to those of men; see Table A1 in Annex), in Southern Eu-
ropean countries, education should make a substantial
difference for native women’s labour market participa-
tion (Scherer & Reyneri, 2008).
Table 1 summarises all the expectations concern-
ing how the employment returns to tertiary education
among immigrants and natives should vary across West-
ern European countries before and after the crisis by gen-
der. Among women, the effect of the crisis is not ex-
plored since the convergence between the Continental
(and UK) and the Southern European models is expected
to be much more limited (Panichella, 2017).
Before proceeding with the empirical test of the
hypotheses shown in Table 1, the possibility that dif-
ferences in the composition of the immigrant popu-
lations influence the cross-country patterns outlined
above needs to be discussed. Gorodzeisky and Semy-
onov (2017) found patterns of immigrants’ labour mar-
ket incorporation not to vary much across countries, de-
spite differences in the composition of migration flows.
However, their study did not include Southern Euro-
pean countries in the comparison. Three sources of het-
erogeneity are potentially relevant in determining the
higher immigrant disadvantage and the higher returns
to education for immigrants in Continental compared to
Southern Europe: differences by area of origin, by reason
for migration and in the proportion of immigrants who
obtained their education in the country of destination.
Immigrants fromMENA and sub-Saharan Africa, who
have been found to have the lowest employment rates
and the highest unemployment rates in Western Europe
(Koopmans, 2016; Lancee, 2016), are substantially over-
represented in Continental Europe. Such compositional
difference is likely to contribute to both the greater disad-
vantage and the higher returns to tertiary education for
immigrants in Continental countries, especially among
women. In fact, the incidence of immigrant women orig-
inating from predominantly Muslim countries is much
higher in Continental Europe, and, apart from possi-
ble discrimination, belonging to Islam and other non-
Christian religions, such as Hinduism and Sikhism, has
been found to be associated with lower female labour
market participation (Guetto & Fellini, 2017; Heath &
Martin, 2013). This may explain why immigrant-native
employment gaps among women are higher in Belgium
and France than in Scandinavian countries (see Figure 3
below). Belgium and France indeed have the highest inci-
dence of immigrantwomen fromMENAand sub-Saharan
Africa. On the contrary, Southern European countries
have received highly feminised migration inflows from
Eastern European new EUmember, post-Soviet and Latin
American countries in the last 20 years, among which
the employment rates tend to be higher in all destina-
tion countries.1 Compositional differences in terms of ar-
eas of origin are unlikely to determine the overall cross-
country patterns, however. For instance, approximately
72%ofmale non-Western immigrants in France originate
from MENA and sub-Saharan Africa, but the immigrant-
native employment gaps are substantially lower than in
Denmark or Sweden (see Figure 2 below), where the
share is approximately 32% and 45% respectively. Thus,
institutional differences, particularly the generosity of
the welfare system and the structure of labour demand,
are likely to play the most important role, especially
among men.
As far as differences in the reasons for migration, the
incidence of refugees is substantially higher in Continen-
tal Europe, and especially in Scandinavian countries, a
factor which may contribute to both worse immigrants’
employment outcomes and a more pronounced educa-
Table 1. Expected intensity of immigrants’ employment returns to tertiary education (and differences with natives) across
Western European countries.
MEN
Continental Europe UK Southern Europe
Immigrants Diff. with natives Immigrants Diff. with natives Immigrants Diff. with natives
Before the crisis + + + + ++ +/− + −
After the crisis + + + + ++ +/− ++ +/−
WOMEN
Continental Europe + UK Southern Europe
Immigrants Diff. with natives Immigrants Diff. with natives
+ + ++ ++ + —
1 These results are available upon request.
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tional gradient in employment (Luik, Emilsson, & Beve-
lander, 2016). On the contrary, refugees have always rep-
resented a negligible proportion of the immigrant pop-
ulations in Southern Europe, at least before the recent
refugee crisis. Finally, in Southern European countries
the percentage of immigrants obtaining their highest
level of education in the destination country has been es-
timated to be particularly small (Fellini & Guetto, 2018),
which could contribute to the lower immigrants’ returns
to education through lower transferability of human cap-
ital and educational credentials. Unfortunately, the data
used in this article do not contain information concerning
immigrants’ reason for migration and place where the
highest level of education has been obtained.
3. Data and Methods
For the analysis of the employment returns to tertiary ed-
ucation, I rely on EU-LFS data (2005–2013) and focus on
natives and first-generation immigrants originating from
less economically-developed countries aged between 25
and 54. Given the aims of empirical analyses, immigrant
status is thus defined considering the country of birth
rather than nationality. Second-generation individuals of
immigrant descent are included among natives as EU-
LFS data do not contain information on parents’ country
of birth. Immigrants from EU-15 countries, EFTA, North
America, Australia and Oceania are excluded, since they
share peculiar characteristics and their employment out-
comes are usually similar to those of natives. As far as
the countries of residence, 10 Western European coun-
tries (Belgium, Denmark, Spain, France, Greece, Italy, the
Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and the UK) have been se-
lected. Ireland has been excluded because the sample
size is too small for non-Western immigrants, thus the
UK is the only representative of the Anglo-Saxon cluster.
For the same reason, Finland has been excluded from
the Continental cluster. Germany has also been excluded
as, due to data limitations, immigrant status can only be
defined through nationality. This poses severe problems
for the cross-country comparison of the returns to edu-
cation for immigrants, as German citizens would include
foreign-born individuals who obtained their education in
the country of origin. Portugal has been excluded from
the Southern European cluster because of the very pecu-
liar characteristics of its non-Western immigrant popula-
tion, made up to a large extent by descendants of expa-
triates from former colonies.2
The dependent variable is a dummy taking value 1
if the respondent worked in the reference week, while
the independent variable is a dummy taking value 1 if
the respondent attained tertiary education.3 Educational
attainment has been dichotomised because tertiary de-
grees are specifically exposed to problems of transferabil-
ity of country-specific human capital and educational cre-
dentials, as well as for reasons of parsimony.4
The first step of the empirical analysis measures the
employment returns to tertiary education by means of
linear probability models implemented in each of the 10
selected countries separately by immigrant status and
gender. The models are specified as follows:
E(Y|X) = b0 + b1 Tertiary + XB + ei (1)
E(Y|X) = b0 + b1 Tertiary + Γ(Origin) + Δ(YSM) +
+ XB + ei
(2)
Models implemented in the sub-samples of natives (1)
include a vector of coefficients (XB) for the following con-
trol variables: six 5-year age dummies, a dummy taking
value 1 if the respondent was in formal education in the
previous four weeks, three dummies for the degree of ur-
banisation of the city of residence (densely, intermediate
or thinly populated), region (NUTS-2) and year dummies
and their interactions.5 Themodels for immigrants (2) in-
clude the same variableswith the addition of two vectors
of dummies (Γ(Origin) and Δ(YSM)) for each area of ori-
gin (newEastern European EUmember states, other non-
EU European countries, MENA, the rest of Africa, Asia
and Latin America) and for years since migration in three
categories (1–5, 6–10, >10).6 All models are estimated
applying EU-LFS weights and with robust standard errors.
In the second step, empirical analyses test possible
changes in the employment returns to tertiary education
across economic conjunctures, focusing on immigrant
and nativemen.Models are implemented with the same
specifications as above but with the addition of an inter-
action term between the possession of a tertiary degree
and period (2005–2007, 2008–2010 and 2011–2013).
4. Results
4.1. Immigrant-Native Employment Gaps in Western
Europe before and after the Economic Crisis
Hypotheses on the cross-country differences in immi-
grants’ employment returns to tertiary education (Ta-
ble 1) rest on the existence of different models of im-
migrants’ labour market incorporation. Thus, before pre-
senting the results of the analysis of the employment
returns to tertiary education, Figures 2 and 3 show ad-
justed immigrant-native employment gaps across the se-
lectedWestern European countries for men and women,
2 In my analytical sample, 86% of non-Western immigrants originate from Sub-Saharan and Latin American countries.
3 See Table A1 in Annex for sample sizes and descriptive statistics for the dependent and independent variables.
4 It should be noted that such dichotomisation may hide possible non-linear effects of education on immigrants’ employment chances. For instance, Luik
et al. (2016) found higher employment rates in Sweden for non-EU immigrants with secondary education, compared to those with tertiary education.
5 Region of residence is not available for the Netherlands in all years and for Denmark in 2005 and 2006, while the degree of urbanisation of the city of
residence is not available for Norway between 2006 and 2009.
6 Information on the years since migration is missing for many respondents in Spain (2005 and 2006) and especially in Denmark. However, model (2)
specified without this variable provided very similar results for both countries.
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Figure 2. Immigrant-native employment probability gaps by country and period (MEN). Notes: Author’s elaborations on
EU-LFS data (2005–2013); points represent the beta coefficients (with 95% c.i.) associated with the immigrant dummy
(2005–2007) plus the interaction coefficients with period dummies (2008–2010, 2011–2013); countries are ordered by
the decreasing size of the gap in the 2005–2007 period (see footnote 7 for additional details about the estimation).
respectively. Estimates are obtained using the same EU-
LFS data and analytical samples described above.7
The empirical evidence is broadly consistent with the
predictions of Figure 1. Starting with men, immigrant dis-
advantage in the pre-crisis period was on average much
stronger in Continental Europe, and especially in Scandi-
navian countries, ranging fromasmuch as a 20 p.p. lower
employment probability in Denmark to approximately 10
p.p. in France. In the UK, the gap was significantly lower
at approximately 4 p.p. At the other end, the gap was
not statistically different from zero in Spain andwas even
marginally positive in Italy and Greece. After the onset of
the crisis, however, a process of convergence occurred.
In fact, while the gaps tend to remain stable or even
slightly decline in all Continental countries and the UK,
in Southern Europe, the gaps increase significantly, espe-
cially in Spain andGreece,where the share of immigrants
who are employed in low-skilled jobs within small firms
and hold fixed-term contracts is very high and where the
crisis has been particularly severe.8
Among women, the cross-country pattern shows
three remarkable differences. First, before the crisis,
the intensity of the employment gaps was substantially
higher throughout Continental Europe, ranging from ap-
proximately 25 p.p. in Belgium to approximately 16 p.p.
in Norway. Second, the UK is now much more similar to
the other Continental countries, with a gap of approxi-
mately 16 p.p. Third, while Southern European countries
again show the lowest levels of immigrant disadvantage,
the crisis has had substantially smaller negative effects
among women compared to men, so the convergence
across countries is also rather limited. This is likely due
to the fact that manual jobs in construction and manu-
facturing, in which male immigrants are usually concen-
7 Each figure plots interaction effects between immigrant status and period on employment probability derived from linear probability models control-
ling for 5-year age intervals, education (primary, low-secondary, tertiary), whether the respondent was in formal education in the previous month, the
degree of urbanisation of the city of residence (densely, intermediate or thinly populated) and region (NUTS-2). All control variables are interacted with
immigrant status. The models are implemented using EU-LFS weights and with robust standard errors.
8 I estimate that in the selected time-window, non-Western immigrants have a 10 and 28 p.p. greater risk of holding a temporary job or work contract
than natives in Greece and Spain, respectively. In the same countries, immigrants also have a 30 and 12 p.p. greater risk than natives of working in a
firm with fewer than 11 employees.
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Figure 3. Immigrant-native employment probability gaps by country and period (WOMEN). Notes: Author’s elaborations
on EU-LFS data (2005–2013); points represent the beta coefficients (with 95% c.i.) associated with the immigrant dummy
(2005–2007) plus the interaction coefficients with period dummies (2008–2010, 2011–2013); countries are ordered by the
decreasing size of the gap in the 2005–2007 period (see footnote 7 for additional details about the estimation).
trated, tend to be more sensitive to the economic cycle
compared to jobs in personal services, in which most im-
migrant women work (Panichella, 2017).
4.2. Employment Returns to Tertiary Education among
Immigrants and Natives in Western Europe
In Figures 4 and 5, employment returns to tertiary ed-
ucation are presented for immigrant men and women,
respectively, together with the immigrant-native differ-
ences in the returns.9 Starting from men, the hypothe-
sis that the returns should be higher for immigrants in
Continental Europe is confirmed, where the possession
of a tertiary degree is associated with a net increase
of approximately 10 p.p. in employment probability. In
Southern European countries, the returns are substan-
tially lower, particularly in Greece, where they are not
statistically different from zero. While the returns are
higher for immigrants than natives in Continental Europe
(approximately 4–5 p.p. higher employment probability
in the Netherlands, Sweden and Belgium; the differences
are statistically significant at the 0.000 level) or virtually
identical (as in France, where the difference is not sta-
tistically significant), in Southern Europe, the returns are
higher for natives (approximately 5 p.p. higher employ-
ment probability in Spain and Greece; the differences
are statistically significant at the 0.000 level). The differ-
ences are not trivial given the high employment rates
among prime-age men. The UK, consistent with the posi-
tioning of this country in the typology shown in Figure 1,
occupies an intermediate position because the absolute
returns among immigrants are in line with Continental
countries, while the difference from the natives is slightly
negative (approximately 1.5 p.p.; the difference is statis-
tically significant at the 0.000 level).
Figure 5 presents the results for women. As hypothe-
sised, while the overall pattern is very similar to the one
found among men, some important differences need to
be underlined. First, absolute returns are higher for im-
migrant women compared to immigrant men in all coun-
tries, but only marginally so in Italy and Greece. In fact,
in Spain, the returns are slightly lower for immigrant
9 Full tables are available upon request.
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Figure 4. Employment returns to tertiary education among immigrants and differenceswith natives (MEN). Notes: Author’s
elaborations on EU-LFS data (2005–2013); dark bars represent beta coefficients (with 95% c.i.) associated with the posses-
sion of a tertiary degree for the sub-samples of immigrants, based on equation (2), while grey bars represent differences
from the same coefficients obtained for natives, based on equation (1).
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Figure 5. Employment returns to tertiary education among immigrants and differences with natives (WOMEN). Notes:
Author’s elaborations on EU-LFS data (2005–2013); dark bars represent beta coefficients (with 95% c.i.) associated with
the possession of a tertiary degree for the sub-samples of immigrants, based on equation (2), while grey bars represent
differences from the same coefficients obtained for natives, based on equation (1).
women. This means that the differences between the
Continental (UK included) and the Southern European
models in the employment returns to tertiary education
are larger among immigrantwomen (ranging between10
and 15 p.p.), consistent with the hypothesis of Table 1.
Second, in Southern Europe, the returns for immigrant
women are substantially lower than those found for their
native counterparts (approximately 20 p.p. in Spain and
Greece; the differences are statistically significant at the
0.000 level). As discussed in Section 2.2, this is likely the
combined effect of the low employment rates among na-
tivewomen and the high employment rates of immigrant
women originating from new Eastern European EUmem-
ber, post-Soviet and Latin American countries in South-
ern Europe.
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4.3. The Effect of the Crisis on the Cross-Country Pattern
of Employment Returns to Tertiary Education
In Figure 6, the results of the second step of the analysis,
which focuses on how the returns have been affected by
the crisis, are shown. As discussed in Section 2.2 and in
light of the results shown in Figures 2 and 3, this is espe-
cially relevant for immigrant and native men. The results
show that in the Netherlands, Belgium and Sweden, not
much has taken place across economic conjunctures, so
the returns are always higher among immigrants. In Nor-
way and Denmark, the results for the immigrant popu-
lations, given their smaller sample sizes, are affected by
high estimation uncertainty. However, in Denmark, as
well as in France and Sweden, a significant increase in
the returns for immigrants relative to natives after the
onset of the crisis can be observed, consistent with the
hypothesis that education becomes more salient for im-
migrants during negative economic conjunctures. In the
UK, employment returns to tertiary education were iden-
tical for immigrants and natives between 2005 and 2010,
while in the last period, returns for immigrants reduced
substantially. This may be explained by the increasing ca-
pability of the British labourmarket to employ immigrant
workers, whichmay have come at the price of poorer job
matches for immigrants.10
In Southern European countries, the employment re-
turns to tertiary education among immigrants are found
to increase. However, the returns also increase among
natives after the onset of the crisis, as a response of their
increasing difficulties in remaining employed (see Sec-
tion 2.2). In fact, in Italy, the returns increase marginally
among immigrants and slightly more so among natives
such that, in the last period, the returns are significantly
higher among natives. In Spain and Greece, countries
where the immigrant-native employment gap increased
the most (see Figure 2), the returns increased substan-
tially for both immigrants and natives. Thus, although im-
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Figure 6. Employment returns to tertiary education among immigrant (dark lines) and native (grey lines) men. Notes: Au-
thor’s elaborations on EU-LFS data (2005–2013); points represent the beta coefficients (with 95% c.i.) associated with
the possession of a tertiary degree (2005–2007) plus the interaction coefficients with period dummies (2008–2010,
2011–2013).
10 In the 2011–2013 period, no immigrant employment disadvantage among men was found (see Figure 2). However, the result may also be due to the
sudden increase in the share of tertiary education among the sampled non-Western immigrants in the UK, which shifted between 2010 and 2011 from
35% to 47%.
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migrants were hit much more heavily, their returns to
tertiary education remain lower than those found for na-
tives even after the crisis.
5. Conclusion and Discussion
This article argued and empirically showed that different
models of immigrants’ labour market incorporation con-
tribute to cross-country differences in the employment
returns to tertiary education inWestern Europe. In Conti-
nental Europe, the immigrant employment disadvantage
tends to be much larger than in the UK and Southern
Europe. Apart from the different composition of the im-
migrant populations by area of origin and other migra-
tory characteristics, I argued that the generosity of the
welfare system for the unemployed and the labour de-
mand bias towards high-skilled jobs are likely to play the
most important role. In such a setting, higher educational
attainment is likely to have a strong pay off for immi-
grants’ employment probability, possibly offsetting the
well-known problems of transferability of human capital
and educational credentials acquired in the origin coun-
try. That is, I have hypothesised that tertiary education
should matter more for immigrants’ employment proba-
bility in Continental European countries and that returns
to education could be higher for immigrants compared
to natives in these countries. On the contrary, in South-
ern Europe, the very small immigrant employment dis-
advantage fostered by the high demand for low-skilled
jobs, at least before the recent economic crisis, should
make education less relevant for immigrants’ employ-
ment chances above and beyond the limited transferabil-
ity of human capital and credentials. In the UK, the re-
turns for immigrants could be as high as in other Conti-
nental European countries given the similar characteris-
tics of the labour demand, but their returns should not
be higher compared to those of natives, given that the
very selective immigration policy favouring the entry of
highly-educated workers limits the immigrant employ-
ment disadvantage. The empirical results are consistent
with these expectations, with larger cross-country differ-
ences found among women, although the substantially
higher incidence of immigrants frompredominantlyMus-
lim countries in Continental Europe is likely a confound-
ing factor.
Western European models of immigrants’ labour
market incorporation have been partly reshaped, how-
ever, following the Great Recession. Empirical evidence
shows that while immigrant-native employment gaps re-
mained unchanged or even decreased in all other coun-
tries, in Southern Europe, the immigrant disadvantage in-
creased substantially, especially among men. Thus, one
could have expected a convergence between the se-
lected European countries regarding immigrant men’s
employment returns to tertiary education. The results
show that the latter did increase in Southern European
countries since the onset of the crisis, although at a dif-
ferent rate. In fact, in the 2011–2013 period, the abso-
lute “employment premium” of a tertiary degree for im-
migrants in Spain is as high as in Continental countries.
However, the returns to education also increased for na-
tive men in these countries as a response to their in-
creasing difficulties in remaining employed. Thus, due
to the crisis, non-Western immigrants in Southern Euro-
pean countries experience what could be defined as a
“double penalty”: not only is their employment gap with
natives as high as in Continental countries after the crisis,
but they also receive lower returns to tertiary education
than their native counterparts. This is especially true in
Italy and Greece, where the absolute returns to tertiary
education for immigrants remain half of those of immi-
grants in Continental Europe, even after the crisis. This re-
sult is consistent with the very poor job matches for non-
Western immigrants in these countries, whose levels of
segregation in the secondary segment of low- and un-
skilled jobs before the crisis were the highest in Western
Europe (Panichella, 2017), irrespective of education and
other individual characteristics (Fellini & Guetto, 2018).
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Annex
Table A1. Sample sizes and proportions of tertiary educated and employed, by sex, immigrant status and country of resi-
dence. Analytical samples used for the analyses of Figures 4, 5 and 6.
Men Women
Immigrants Natives Immigrants Natives
Belgium 20,864 165,062 23,554 168,259
% tertiary 26.56 33.61 27.90 40.73
% emp 65.97 88.23 44.03 76.90
Denmark 5,833 136,156 8,193 155,794
% tertiary 30.52 33.90 30.21 44.04
% emp 70.44 89.98 57.28 86.05
Spain 18,746 284,749 21,401 293,961
% tertiary 20.45 31.28 23.62 35.21
% emp 74.56 83.01 60.12 61.71
France 66,907 611,122 78,573 647,918
% tertiary 27.37 28.73 26.33 33.96
% emp 74.99 87.93 51.08 78.21
Greece 45,984 455,239 45,284 470,700
% tertiary 8.27 24.04 15.16 24.73
% emp 84.41 85.38 53.36 58.53
Italy 89,638 1,019,100 107,813 1,057,260
% tertiary 7.49 13.23 13.30 16.83
% emp 84.32 84.14 53.09 58.92
Netherlands 19,661 246,675 25,164 254,568
% tertiary 24.11 34.95 23.24 32.16
% emp 77.70 93.83 56.89 81.19
Norway 4,240 60,453 5,113 59,810
% tertiary 28.25 32.10 34.34 42.16
% emp 76.26 90.60 66.07 85.02
Sweden 55,284 467,992 67,696 471,437
% tertiary 31.67 28.23 35.64 41.34
% emp 72.62 90.18 62.28 87.15
UK 20,277 155,039 23,174 172,737
% tertiary 35.87 32.59 34.69 34.64
% emp 83.77 87.31 58.62 76.85
Notes: Author’s elaborations on EU-LFS data (2005–2013), no weights applied; respondents aged 25 to 54; immigrants include first-
generation immigrants originating from non-Western countries, while second-generation individuals of immigrant descent are included
among natives.
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